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Abstract. This paper reports on a system for automated agent negotiation, based on a 
formal and executable approach to capture the behavior of parties involved in a 
negotiation. It uses the JADE agent framework, and its major distinctive feature is the 
use of declarative negotiation strategies. The negotiation strategies are expressed in a 
declarative rules language, defeasible logic, and are applied using the implemented 
system DR-DEVICE. The key ideas and the overall system architecture are described, 
and a particular negotiation case is presented in detail. 
1. Introduction 
As the amount of commercial transactions carried out through the Internet increases at 
a spectacular rate, the interest for partially or totally automating the negotiation of the 
terms of these transactions has rapidly become a hot research topic [20]. 
Consequently, automated negotiation has evolved in a few years from a futuristic 
vision to a promising technology [27]. In particular, optimal strategies for several 
forms of automated bargaining and auctioning under simplified assumptions have 
been identified, and the extensions of these results to more realistic settings have been 
studied by the game-theory and the distributed artificial intelligence communities 
([25], [34], [36]). Furthermore, several tournaments where automated traders compete 
to maximize their profits in electronic auction houses have been organized (e.g. [22], 
[40]), and their results are quite encouraging. 
Software agents are becoming a choice technology for carrying out automated 
negotiations [36]. In this approach, each party is represented through an agent who 
interacts either directly with the other parties, or through a broker. The focus of our 
work is on the automated negotiation aspect of e-commerce. As stated in [24], 
automated negotiation is the process by which two or more agents communicate and 
try to come to a mutually acceptable agreement on some matter. The basic dimensions 
of automated negotiation are negotiation protocols and negotiation strategies. A 
Negotiation protocol is a set of rules which govern the interaction, and a negotiation 
strategy is a decision making model, which participants employ in order to achieve 
their goal in line with the negotiation protocol. The issue in this context is thus “how 
to express a negotiation strategy”. 
This work reports on an implemented system for automated agent negotiation, which 
is based on ideas of the abstract negotiation model of [13]. That work presented a 
simple yet expressive framework for specifying negotiating agents' strategies, in a 
way that their decisions are predictable and explainable. Specifically, we explore in 
this paper the suitability of defeasible logic programming ([3], [18], [31]) for 
expressing the decision-making process of negotiating agents. In agreement with [13], 
we argue that defeasible logic is suitable for expressing negotiation strategies, since it 
straightforwardly captures concepts such as preferences, hypotheses, arguments and 
counter-arguments. Although defeasible logic is certainly not an end-user language 
but rather a developer's one, it could provide a foundation for designing "user-
friendly'' interfaces for negotiation strategy specification. And given the low 
computational complexity of defeasible logic programming [28], these strategies can 
also be executed in real time.  
The viability of these ideas is demonstrated through a prototypical implementation, 
which constitutes the main contribution of the present work. The implemented 
system, DR-NEGOTIATE, is based on the JADE multi-agent framework, and uses 
DR-DEVICE [6] as the deductive engine to apply defeasible logic programs (the 
negotiation strategies). The overall system design is described, and its functionality is 
demonstrated through a concrete example.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the overall 
approach and the underlying formalisms, with emphasis on the motivation of using 
defeasible logic programming. Section 3 presents the system architecture, while 
sections 4-6 illustrate the functionality and use of the system based on a concrete case. 
Section 7 discusses related work, and section 8 concludes the paper with a summary 
and description of current and future work.  
2. Rationale, Approach and Enabling Formalisms 
2.1 An Architecture for Negotiating Agents 
In this section we briefly present the architecture proposed by [13]. We view the 
negotiation process as a set of software agents which interact in order to reach an 
agreement. Agents participating in a negotiation can interact directly or through a 
broker. In some situations, the role of a party during the negotiation process is almost 
entirely carried out by the broker. This is the case for instance in some auction houses, 
where the auction broker takes the place of the seller. 
Following an abstract architecture for agents with memory presented in [44] each of 
the software agents is composed of four modules: (i) a memory which contains the 
history of the past decisions and interactions of the agent, including its current 
intentions, (ii) a communication module responsible of receiving and sending 
messages to the other agents and interacting with the user, (iii) a reasoning module 
which encodes the decision-making part of the agent, and (iv) a control module which 
coordinates the other components. As a refinement to this architecture, we choose to 
express the control module as a finite automaton (see section 4), the communication 
module was implemented using the JADE platform (see section 3), the reasoning 
module as a defeasible logic program (see next subsection), and the memory as a 
knowledge base of facts.  
Conceptually, each time a negotiating agent is notified of a change in the negotiation 
status, it updates the base facts stored in the knowledge base accordingly, and it 
activates the reasoning module. The reasoning module reads these facts from the 
knowledge base, attempts to deduce new facts and refute existing ones, and updates 
the derived facts stored in the knowledge base accordingly. Depending on the state of 
the knowledge base after this revision process, the control module determines whether 
it should ask the communication module to submit a proposal or counter-proposal 
immediately, wait for some further event, or retract from the negotiation. It is also 
through the communication module that the control module communicates with the 
agent responsible of managing the user interface. This separation between the agent 
responsible of handling the negotiation process, and the one responsible of interacting 
with the user (e.g. for collecting the parameters of the negotiation, or for displaying its 
status), adds considerable flexibility to the architecture. In particular, these two agents 
can be located in different machines, and the negotiating agent can even be mobile. 
 
2.2 Desired Properties for Negotiation Strategy Representation Formalisms 
Before choosing one or several languages for the specification of negotiation 
strategies, it is important to establish a set of criteria that such languages need to 
satisfy. The criteria presented below are inspired from those formulated by [21] in the 
context of techniques for information modeling. They encompass several well-known 
principles of language design. 
Firstly, a language for specifying negotiation strategies needs to be formal, in the 
sense that its syntax and its semantics should be precisely defined. This ensures that 
the strategy specifications can be interpreted unambiguously (both by machines and 
humans) and that they are both predictable and explainable. In addition, a formal 
foundation is a prerequisite for verification purposes. 
Secondly, the language should be conceptual. This, following the well-known 
Conceptualization Principle of [17], effectively means that it should allow its users to 
focus only and exclusively on aspects related to strategies, without having to deal with 
any aspects related to their realization or implementation. Examples of conceptually 
irrelevant aspects in the context that we consider are: physical data organization and 
access, platform heterogeneity (e.g. message-passing formats), and book-keeping (e.g. 
message queue management). 
Thirdly, in order to ease the interpretation of strategies and to facilitate their 
documentation, the language should be comprehensible. Comprehensibility can be 
achieved by offering a graphical representation, by ensuring that the formal and 
intuitive meanings are as much in line as possible, and by offering structuring 
mechanisms (e.g. decomposition). These structuring mechanisms often lead to 
modularity, which in our setting means that a slight modification to a strategy should 
concern only a specific part of its specification. Closely related to its 
comprehensibility, the language that we aim should be suitable, that is, it should offer 
concepts close to those involved in negotiations. 
As we are interested in the automation of the negotiation process, the strategy 
description language should be executable, and its execution should exhibit 
acceptable performances even for complex strategies involving many issues (i.e. the 
execution performance should be scalable). 
Finally, the language that we aim should be sufficiently expressive, that is, it should 
be able to precisely capture a wide spectrum of strategies. 
 
2.3 On Defeasible Logic Programming 
Defeasible reasoning is a simple rule-based approach to reasoning with incomplete 
and inconsistent information. It can represent facts, rules, and priorities among rules. 
This reasoning family comprises defeasible logics ([31], [3]) and Courteous Logic 
Programs [18], and has the following characteristics: 
• They are rule-based, without disjunction 
• Classical negation is used in the heads and bodies of rules, but negation-as-
failure is not necessarily used in the object language (it can easily be 
simulated, if necessary [4]) 
• Rules may support conflicting conclusions 
• The logics are skeptical in the sense that conflicting rules do not fire. Thus 
consistency is preserved 
• Priorities on rules may be used to resolve some conflicts among rules 
• The logics take a pragmatic view and have low computational complexity [28] 
Facts denote simple pieces of information deemed to be true regardless of other 
knowledge items. A typical fact is that an apartment a is air-conditioned: aircon(a).  
There are two kinds of rules (fuller versions of defeasible logics include also defeaters 
[3]: Strict rules are denoted by A → p, and are interpreted in the classical sense: 
whenever the premises are indisputable then so is the conclusion. An example of a 
strict rule is “Professors are faculty members”. Written formally: professor(X) → 
faculty(X). Inference from strict rules only is called definite inference. Strict rules are 
intended to define relationships that are definitional in nature, for example ontological 
knowledge.  
Defeasible rules are denoted by A ⇒ p, and can be defeated by contrary evidence. An 
example of such a rule is faculty(X) ⇒ tenured(X) which reads as follows: “Faculty 
members are typically tenured”. 
A superiority relation on R is an acyclic relation > on R (that is, the transitive closure 
of > is irreflexive). When r1 > r2, then r1 is called superior to r2, and r2 inferior to r1. 
This expresses that r1 may override r2. For example, given the defeasible rules 
r: professor(X) ⇒ tenured(X) 
r’: visiting(X) ⇒ ¬tenured(X) 
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a 
visiting professor is tenured. But if we introduce a superiority relation > with r’ > r, 
then we can indeed conclude that he/she cannot be tenured. We assume that the 
superiority relation is acyclic. 
For each literal p we define the set of p-complementary literals C(p), that is, the set of 
literals that cannot hold when p does. Let us consider an example: suppose we have 
the predicates married and bachelor.  Here, we define, for any constant a, 
C(married(a)) = {¬married(a), bachelor(a)}. We know that, under the usual 
interpretation of the predicates, they cannot be true at the same time for one and the 
same individual.  We stipulate that the negation of a literal is always complementary 
to the literal. 
We now give a short informal presentation of how conclusions are drawn in 
Defeasible Logic. A conclusion P can be derived if there is a rule whose conclusion is 
P, whose prerequisites (antecedents) are either already been proved or given in the 
case at hand (i.e. facts), and any stronger rule whose conclusion is in C(P) has 
prerequisites that fail to be derived. In other words, a conclusion P is (defeasibly) 
derivable when: 
• P is a fact; or 
• there is an applicable strict or defeasible rule for P, and either 
– all the rules for P-complementary literals are discarded or 
– every rule for a P-complementary literal is weaker than an applicable strict 
or defeasible rule for P. 
A formal definition of the proof theory is found in [3]. A model theoretic semantics is 
found in [29], and argumentation semantics is discussed in [16].  
In what follows, we rather focus on the application of defeasible logic to automated 
negotiation. Specifically, we sketch a set of guidelines that can be used to formalize a 
negotiation strategy in defeasible logic. First of all, the negotiating agent developer 
needs to conduct an information analysis in order to identify an appropriate set of 
predicates to encode the negotiation strategy. These predicates must collectively 
capture the information characterizing a given negotiation situation (e.g. negotiation 
issues, user parameters, thresholds, limit values, histories of offers, etc.) as well as the 
conclusions that can be derived from a negotiation situation (e.g. the actions that may 
need to be undertaken at a given point during the negotiation). 
Next, the developer needs to identify the constraints over the negotiation, and the 
business rules governing the negotiation strategy. These constraints and business rules 
must then be classified as either hard or soft. Hard constraints (or hard business rules) 
are those that apply in any situation, regardless of the context. These constraints set 
the basic boundaries of the negotiating agent behavior, and are used (for example) to 
model decisions that must be systematically taken when a given condition holds. Hard 
constraints and hard business rules are formalized directly as strict rules. 
Soft constraints (or soft business rules) on the other hand can be violated under 
particular circumstances (i.e. they have exceptions). They are used to model the 
guidelines and user preferences that the negotiating agent will consider after making 
sure that all the hard constraints and rules are met. A soft constraint is formalized as a 
team of defeasible rules. A soft constraint is formalized as a team of defeasible rules. 
Specifically the soft constraint itself is first translated into a defeasible rule in this 
team, and each exception to the constraint is then encoded as a separate defeasible 
rule, whose conclusion is the negation of the conclusion of the defeasible rule 
corresponding to the soft constraint. For example, if a soft constraint C is formalized 
by the defeasible rule r1: A1,...,An ⇒ B (meaning that normally if A1,...,An hold, then 
so should B), if we know that the state of affairs D constitutes an exception to C, then 
D must be formalized as r2: D ⇒ ¬B. Since D is an exception to C, we have to 
specify that r2 has precedence over r1, i.e. r2 > r1. 
In the third step, the developer should identify pairs of incompatible literals. Two 
literals are said to be incompatible if they cannot both hold at the same time, which 
essentially means that one of the literals implies the negation of the other. Having 
identified conflicting literals, and with the aid of an inference tool, the developer can 
then detect conflicting (defeasible) rules, i.e. rules such that the literals appearing in 
the conclusions are incompatible. As we have alluded to above, no conclusion can be 
drawn from conflicting rules in defeasible logic, unless these rules are prioritized. For 
each pair of conflicting defeasible rules, the developer must analyze what will happen 
when the conjunction of the antecedents of the rules holds, and must deduce a priority 
between these rules from this analysis. In some cases, this analysis can be partially 
supported by an automated tool. 
Indeed, several criteria for automatically determining priorities among rules have 
been put forth, one of the most common being the specificity criterion. In a nutshell, a 
rule is more specific than another one, when it applies in all cases where the other 
does. In other words, the set of prerequisites of the more general rule is a subset of the 
set of prerequisites of the more specific rule. In such cases, it can be suggested to the 
developer to give a higher priority to the more specific rule. However, the developer 
may decide to do the opposite, since specificity alone is not always an appropriate 
criterion for ranking rules. In addition, in general, two rules cannot be compared 
according to the specificity criterion, and thus, the developer must either determine 
different ranking criteria or perform a manual ranking. 
 
2.4 Why Defeasible Logics for Negotiation Strategies 
Applying a negotiation strategy in a particular context is an intensive decision-making 
process. While most aspects of negotiation strategies could be fully captured in 
classical logic programming (which has a formal semantics and has proven to be a 
powerful tool for building decision-making systems), this would put a burden on the 
developers of strategies, since logic programming is a generic paradigm and offers 
nothing specific to strategy specification (such as argumentation, defeasibility, 
hypothetical reasoning, preferences, etc.). Accordingly, we propose to use a logic 
programming language based on non-monotonic reasoning. Among the many 
members of the family of non-monotonic logics, we choose defeasible logic [3] for 
the following reasons. 
• A negotiation can be thought of as a dialogue between parties concerning the 
resolution of a dispute. This suggests that argumentation based reasoning 
formalisms are suitable to characterized it. In [16], it was shown that defeasible 
logic can be characterized by an argumentation semantics, thus the formal 
semantics of defeasible logic is in line with the argumentative nature of 
negotiations. 
• Given the close connection between derivations in Defeasible Logic and 
arguments, strategies expressed in Defeasible Logic are explainable. 
• Defeasible logic is a skeptical formalism, meaning that it does not support 
contradictory conclusions. Instead it seeks to resolve conflicts. In cases where 
there is some support for concluding A but also support for concluding ¬A, the 
logic does not conclude either of them (thus the name “skeptical”).  If the support 
for A has priority over the support for ¬A then A would be concluded. We believe 
that non-skeptical reasoning is inappropriate for modeling decision-making 
processes such as negotiations, since it is quite useless to deduce both that a 
decision should be taken, and that it should not be taken. 
• Defeasible logic integrates the concept of priorities between rules, thereby 
supporting a direct way of modeling preferences, without having to attach a metric 
to them, as it is the case of approaches based on utility functions [32]. 
• Regarding strategy specification, most of the current systems adopt a quantitative 
approach based on utility functions. Very often, it is not easy to find the right 
utility functions for a given set of negotiation issues, especially in situations where 
one needs to express preferences without attaching a metric to them. Moreover, 
utility functions are mostly used to determine preferences that can otherwise be 
expressed in a more comprehensible and suitable way through defeasible rules and 
priorities among these rules. For this reason, we believe that defeasible logic is 
more suitable than, or at least complementary to, strategy specification approaches 
purely based on utility functions.  
• Defeasible logic has a linear complexity, and existing implementations are able to 
deal with non trivial theories consisting of over 100,000 rules [30], offering thus 
an executable and scalable system. 
3. Implemented Agent Architecture 
The agent framework we used is JADE ([8], [23]), an open-source middleware for the 
development of distributed multi-agent applications based on the peer-to-peer 
communication architecture. JADE is Java-based and compliant with the FIPA 
specification. It provides libraries for agent communication and interaction, based on 
FIPA standards [14]. It also provides tools for agent lifecycle management, inspection 
of exchanged messages and debugging. JADE provided us with the agent 
infrastructure we desired.  
For the reasoning module of the agent we used the defeasible reasoning system DR-
DEVICE [6]. Its user interface is compatible with RuleML, the main standardization 
effort for rules on the semantic web and is based on a CLIPS-based implementation of 
deductive rules [7]. 
The architecture of the negotiating agent is depicted in Fig. 1. When the agent is 
notified of an external event, such as an incoming message (step 1), the control 
module initially retrieves a fact template from the local storage unit (step 2) and 
consequently, the negotiation parameters from the memory (step 3). The template is 
an empty placeholder in line with DR-DEVICE system syntax. When the template is 
filled with the negotiation parameters, is then regarded as “the facts”. The control 
module updates the knowledge base with the new facts (step 4) and then activates 
DR-DEVICE (step 5). DR-DEVICE in turn retrieves from the knowledge base the 
facts, along with the strategy (step 6) and starts the inferencing process. After the 
inferencing has been completed, the knowledge base is updated with the results (step 
7). The control module queries the knowledge base for the result (step 8) and after a 
short processing an appropriate message is posted to the communication module.  
4. The Negotiation Protocol: An Example 
As we have already stressed, a basic condition for the automation of the negotiation 
process among intelligent agents is the existence of a negotiation protocol, which 
encodes the allowed sequences of actions. Our first thought was to use a well-defined 
protocol for 1-1 automated negotiation. Although FIPA provides a plethora of 
standardized protocols, such as FIPA brokering, FIPA English auction, FIPA Contract 
net etc., we found that there is no standard interaction protocol for 1-1 automated 
negotiation.  
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Fig. 1. Architecture of Negotiating Agent. 
As a result, we implemented a negotiation protocol proposed in [41]. This protocol is 
a finite state machine that must be hard-coded to all agents, participating into the 
negotiation. Bartolini et al. [5] say that most multi-agents systems today use a single 
negotiation protocol which is usually a finite state machine, hard-coded to all the 
agents, leading to an inflexible environment, which can accept only agents designed 
for it. To overcome this inflexibility they propose a generic interaction protocol which 
can be parameterized with different negotiation rules and give different negotiation 
mechanisms. The rules can be exchanged among agents that are able to inform their 
peers, which protocol they wish to use. Governatori et al. [15] show how to use 
Defeasible Logic to represent both negotiation protocols and strategies. However, the 
focus of our work is not on protocol design but rather on declarative negotiation 
strategy specification, therefore we believe the protocol we use is a good solution for 
our demonstrator. 
Our protocol is a finite state machine with discrete states and transition. The protocol 
is depicted in Fig. 2. INIT is the initial state of the negotiation, PROP_SENT, 
PROP_REC, PROP_REJ, PROP_ACC, ACC_PROP, REJ_PROP, represent the states 
of a negotiation, and TERM is the final state in which there is an agreement, or a 
failure of agreement between the participants. Send and Recv predicates represent the 
interactions which cause state transitions. To clarify the function of the protocol we 
give an example. If the sequence of transitions is the following: INITÆPROP_SENT 
ÆPROP_RECÆACC_PROPÆTERM, that means that the agent initially sends a call 
for proposal message (CFP) to the other negotiating agent (INITÆPROP_SENT), 
then it receives a propose message (PROP_SENTÆPROP_REC) and after the 
evaluation it decides to send an accept message (PROP_RECÆACC_PROP). Lastly 
it receives an accept message and the negotiation terminates successfully 
(ACC_PROPÆTERM). We make the convention that the participant that plays the 
role of the buyer starts the negotiation by posting a CFP message. So, while the 
protocol can be used as it is by a buyer, it needs a small modification for a seller. 
Particularly instead of the transition INITÆPROP_SENT there should be a transition 
INITÆPROP_REC with label “Recv CFP”. 
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Fig. 2. 1-1 Negotiation Protocol. 
5. The Negotiation Strategy: An Example 
The strategy of a potential buyer or seller during a negotiation scenario is very critical 
for the outcome of the encounter. Every strategy is indeed designed in line with a 
particular protocol. As we have already seen, there is a plethora of strategies classified 
according to different criteria. We based the strategies we used on the work of Tsang 
et al. [43]. They define the simple constrained bargaining game between one buyer 
and one seller. Some of the most important assumptions are that the seller is 
constrained by the cost and the number of days within which it has to sell, while the 
buyer is constrained by its utility and the number of days within which it has to buy. 
In addition, neither the buyer nor the seller has information about the constraints of 
the other. The players make alternative bids with the seller to bid first and they can 
bid only once per day. An agreement is reached when both buyer and seller bid for the 
same price. Finally, according to the assumptions, if a deal cannot be made before a 
player runs out of time the negotiation terminates. Tsang et al. propose a number of 
different strategies both for buyer and sellers. For our buyer we adopted the simple 
buyer strategy, whose characteristics are found in the following table. 
Table 1. Buyer’s Strategy Characteristics. 
Strategy 
Name 
First Bid 
Algorithm 
Offer-
Acceptance 
Criterion 
Last Day 
BiDDING 
General Bid 
Algorithm 
Simple 
Buyer 
Utility/Days to 
Buy (DTB) 
Counteroffer 
+Minimum 
Profit (MP)< 
Utility 
Utility –MP Bid half way 
between 
previous bid 
price and 
utility 
 
In our work we have modified the strategy of the buyer as follows: Firstly, we relaxed 
the rule that only one offer per day can be made, which is completely unrealistic in an 
e-Commerce setting. Instead we allow one offer per negotiation step. The negotiation 
step is handled by the protocol and increases each time a player (buyer or seller) has 
made an offer and subsequently has received a counteroffer or another message. So, 
we speak of time to buy (TTB) and time to sell (TTS), measured in negotiation steps. 
Secondly, except for the offer-acceptance criterion we have added an extra check 
during the offer submission to avoid non-beneficial results for the player (see below). 
Thirdly, we incorporated into the strategy parameters relevant to the protocol like the 
state of the negotiation and the step of the negotiation. Lastly, an agreement is reached 
when both buyer and seller send an “agree” message. 
For the buyer participating into the negotiation, we used the modified strategy of 
Tsang et al. and we expressed it in defeasible logic and for the seller we used a 
strategy hard coded in Java to demonstrate that agents with diferrent architecture can 
interact without any problems – we could have easily expressed the seller’s strategy in 
defeasible logic as well. The seller’s strategy is quite similar with that of buyer except 
for the general bidding strategy. The seller decreases its offer by a fixed amount and 
not in a linear fashion like the buyer.  
First we express the buyer’s strategy in defeasible logic (see Fig. 3) and then we give 
some samples of the strategy expressed in DR-DEVICE’s defeasible logic rule 
language in native CLIPS-like syntax (see Fig. 4). The predicates we use are the 
following: 
• Step(s): The step of the negotiation. When a buyer or seller sends a message and 
then receives another one the step is increased by one. 
• Counteroffer(c): The offer which a buyer or seller receives from the opponent. 
• Min_profit(mp): The minimum profit the buyer seeks after buying the product. 
• Utility(u): The utility of the buyer if it buys the product. 
• Ttb(ttb):  The time (negotiation steps) the buyer has at its disposal in order to buy 
the product. 
• State(st): The current state of the negotiation according to the protocol. The 
possible states are: 
1 (PROP_SENT): The buyer has already sent a CFP or a PROPOSE message. 
2 (PROP_REC): The buyer has already received a PROPOSE message. 
3 (PROP_REJ): The buyer has already received a REJECT message. 
4 (REJ_PROP): The buyer has rejected the received proposal (i.e. has already 
sent a REJECT message). 
5 (PROP_ACC): The buyer has already received an ACCEPT message. 
6 (ACC_PROP): The buyer has accepted the received proposal (i.e. has already 
sent an ACCEPT message). 
• Previous_bid(prb): The previous bid of the buyer; if it is zero, then the buyer has 
not yet made a offer. 
 
r1:State(2), Counteroffer(c), Min_profit(mp), Utility(u), c+mp≤u/2 
   ⇒ ACCEPT_PROPOSAL 
r2:State(2), Counteroffer(c), Min_profit(mp), Utility(u), c+mp>u 
   ⇒ ~ACCEPT_PROPOSAL 
r3:State(5) ⇒ ACCEPT_PROPOSAL 
r4:Step(0), Ttb(ttb), Counteroffer(c), Min_profit(mp), Utility(u), State(2), 
     u/2<c+mp≤u, bid=u/ttb  ⇒  PROPOSE(bid) 
r5:Step(s), Ttb(ttb), State(2), Counteroffer(c), Min_profit(mp), Utility(u), 
     Previous_bid(0), 0<s<ttb, u/2<c+mp≤u, bid=u/ttb  ⇒  PROPOSE(bid) 
r6:Step(s), Ttb(ttb), State(2), Counteroffer(c), Min_profit(mp), Utility(u), 
     Previous_bid(prb), 0<s<ttb, u/2<c+mp≤u, prb!=0, bid=(u-prb)/2+prb 
   ⇒ PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid) 
r7:Step(s), Ttb(ttb), State(3), Previous_bid(prb), Utility(u),  
     0<s<ttb, bid=(u-prb)/2+prb  ⇒  PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid)  
r8:PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid)  ⇒  PROPOSE(bid) 
r9:Min_profit(mp), Utility(u), PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid), bid>u-mp ⇒ ~PROPOSE(bid) 
r10:Min_profit(mp), Utility(u), PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid), bid>u-mp, new_bid=u-mp 
   ⇒ PROPOSE(new_bid) 
r9>r8 
Fig. 3. Buyer’s Strategy in Defeasible Logic. 
Rules R1, R2, and R3 define the conditions for the acceptance or rejection of a 
proposal. More specifically, rule R1 states that if the current state of the negotiation is 
2 (i.e. PROP_REC, when the agent has received a “propose” message) and if 
opponent’s offer plus the minimum profit is less or equal to half the utility, the 
counteroffer is accepted in all cases. R2 describes the case in which opponent’s offer 
plus the minimum profit is greater than its utility and the counteroffer is rejected. 
There is also an intermediate counteroffer area, between those two limits, whereas the 
agent cannot immediately accept or reject the proposal, but it should make a 
counteroffer (see rules R4-R10). Finally, rule R3 defines that if the current state of the 
negotiation is 5 (i.e. PROP_ACC, when the agent has received an “accept” message) 
it also sends an “accept” message.  
Rules R4 through R10 define different bidding scenarios according to the step of the 
negotiation. There are three levels for the bidding policy: bidding of first step, bidding 
of last step and general bidding policy. R4 states that if the negotiation is at state 2 
(PROP_REC) and at the first step, the utility divided by the ttb (i.e. the starting bid) is 
offered, when the proposal received is at an intermediate value range (see above). 
Rules R5, R6, R7, R8, R9, and R10 are the rules for the general bidding policy. 
According to R5, if the current state of the negotiation is 2 (i.e. PROP_REC, the agent 
has received a “propose” message) but it has not made one (i.e. previous bid is zero), 
it offers the utility divided by the ttb (i.e. the starting bid). R6 defines that if the 
current state of the negotiation is 2 (i.e. PROP_REC, the agent has received a 
“propose” message) and it has made an offer in the previous step, it increases linearly 
its offer, according to the following type: 
_
_
2
u t i l i t y p r e v io u s b id
b id p r e v io u s b id
−
= +  
R7 describes that if the current state of the negotiation is 3 (i.e. PROP_REJ, the agent 
has received a “reject” message) it also offers the above bid. R8 defines that if R7 or 
R6 is true then the computed amount for the bid is to be offered. However, R9 checks 
whether the bid to be offered is lower than the utility minus the minimum profit and if 
it is not, then R10 is fired. Rules R9 and R10 are additional checks that ensure that the 
offered amount of money for the product is not against the benefit of the buyer. The 
control and the termination condition of the negotiation process are handled by the 
control module and there is no rule for that purpose. However, this is in accordance to 
the declarative nature of our negotiation specification scheme. 
Regarding the DR-DEVICE version of the negotiation strategy (Fig. 4), instead of 
predicates two classes are used: buyer and protocol. The former models (as object 
attributes) information needed for the negotiation strategy that concern solely the 
buyer, namely the minimum profit the buyer seeks, its utility and its ttb. The protocol 
class models information regarding the negotiation process, namely the state of the 
negotiation, the current step, the previous bid of the buyer and the counter-offer 
received from the seller. Furthermore, both classes hold additional administrative 
information, such as the names of the buyer and seller agents, and a link between each 
buyer object with the corresponding protocol instance. 
 
(defeasiblerule r1 
 (buyer (min-profit ?mp) (utility ?u) (protocol ?p)) 
 (protocol (prot-name ?p) (sel-name ?s) (state 2)  
    (counteroffer ?c&:(<= (+ ?c ?mp) (/ ?u 2)))) 
  => 
 (acceptable (seller ?s) (proposal ?c))) 
(defeasiblerule r2 
 (buyer (min-profit ?mp) (utility ?u) (protocol ?p)) 
 (protocol (prot-name ?p) (sel-name ?s) (state 2)  
    (counteroffer ?c&:(> (+ ?c ?mp) ?u))) 
  => 
 (not (acceptable (seller ?s) (proposal ?c)))) 
(defeasiblerule r4 
 (buyer (min-profit ?mp) (utility ?u) (protocol ?p) (ttb ?ttb)) 
 (protocol (prot-name ?p) (sel-name ?s) (step 0) (state 2)  
  (counteroffer ?c&:(and (> (+ ?c ?mp) (/ ?u 2)) (<= (+ ?c ?mp) ?u)))) 
  => 
 (calc (bind ?first-bid (/ ?u ?ttb))) 
 (propose (seller ?s) (bid ?first-bid))) 
(defeasiblerule r7 
 (buyer (min-profit ?mp) (utility ?u) (protocol ?p) (ttb ?ttb)) 
 (protocol (prot-name ?p) (sel-name ?s) (prevbid ?prb) 
   (step ?st&:(and (> ?st 0) (< ?st ?ttb))) (state 3) ) 
  => 
 (calc (bind ?bid (+ ?prb (/ (- ?u ?prb) 2)))) 
 (preliminary-propose (seller ?s) (bid ?bid))) 
(defeasiblerule r9 
 (declare (superior r8)) 
 (buyer (min-profit ?mp) (utility ?u) (protocol ?p)) 
 (protocol (prot-name ?p) (sel-name ?s) ) 
 (preliminary-propose (seller ?s) (bid ?bid&:(> ?bid (- ?u ?mp) ))) 
  => 
 (not (propose (seller ?s) (bid ?bid)))) 
Fig. 4. Fragment of buyer’s strategy in DR-DEVICE. 
6. Negotiation Trace 
In this section we demonstrate the operation of the system and we scrutinize a 
negotiation trace between a buyer agent and a seller agent. The JADE platform 
provides a special-purpose agent which is called sniffer. Sniffer can monitor the 
exchanged messages of two or more agents in the agent platform. The specific 
parameters of the negotiation are given in the next table. We examine the trace from 
the buyer’s viewpoint. The parameters of the negotiation are summarized in Table 2. 
As we can see in Fig. 5, the buyer initially issues a “Call for Proposal” message 
(CFP). At this point, as it is the first time we present a trace, we analyze the structure 
of exchanged messages. FIPA ACL messages are built up of three layers of 
languages: (a) elements of the world are defined in an ontology, (b) an agent’s 
intention to describe or alter the world is expressed by a communicative act or speech-
act such as INFORM, and (c) statements about the world are expressed by means of a 
Content Language. In order for agents to be able to reason about the effects of their 
communication, ACL messages are inserted into proper Agent Interaction Protocols 
that describe allowed sequences of actions among agents.  
Table 2. Negotiation Parameters for Negotiation Trace. 
BUYER SELLER 
Ttb=5 Tts=10 
Minimum Profit = 100 Minimum Profit = 100 
Utility = 1000 Maximum Profit = 800 
 Bid decrement = 40 
 Cost = 200 
 
 
((action  
  (agent-identifier  
    :name BUYER@anemos:1099/JADE)  
    (SUGGEST  
      :SUGGEST_qty (QUANTITY  
        :QUANTITY_value "1")  
        :SUGGEST_prc (PRICE  
          :PRICE_value "")  
        :SUGGEST_item  
          (ITEM  
            :ITEM_name "Nokia 1100"  
         :ITEM_colour black)))) 
Fig. 5. Initialization of the Negotiation: Buyer issues a "Call for Proposal". 
At the left-hand side of Fig. 5 one can see all the interactions between the buyer and 
the seller agent. We analyze the first interaction. The ACL message that corresponds 
to interaction 1 is depicted next to the interactions and is indicated by a solid arrow. 
The Communicative Act (or Speech-Act) of this ACL message is “CFP”. The 
Ontology, which both buyer and seller share, is called “Negotiation” and the used 
Interaction protocol (or Negotiation Protocol) is called “Simple-Bargaining”. The 
message content ontology allows agents to model facts, beliefs, allowed actions, 
hypotheses and predications about a domain [1]. We have developed an RDF Schema 
ontology for actions that agents can request and perform (e.g. suggest) during the 
negotiation procedure, and predicates for error messages. We have also defined a few 
characteristics for the negotiated products. 
The content of the message is indicated by the dashed arrow in Fig. 5. According to 
the content of the message, the Actor of the action is Buyer who suggests a 
negotiation template, about a single item of a black NOKIA 1100 mobile phone. For 
the content language, we have used both FIPA SL0 and FIPA-RDF. All the examples 
we show here use FIPA SL0, whereas Fig. 6 shows an interaction example in RDF. 
Either of those expressions is wrapped in an XML message, before transmission. 
The seller responds with a “Propose” and the proposed amount is 1000 (Fig. 7). 
According to the rule R2 of the buyer’s strategy, as long as the relation c+mp > u is 
true, the buyer keeps rejecting the offer. 
 
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"  
   xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/PR-rdf-schema-19990303#"  
   xmlns:fipa-rdf="http://www.fipa.org/schemas/FIPA-RDF#" 
   xmlns:Negotiation="http://www.csd.uoc.gr/~dogjohn#"> 
 <fipa-rdf:object> 
  <fipa-rdf:CONTENT_ELEMENT> 
   <rdf:Description> 
    <fipa-rdf:type>action</fipa-rdf:type> 
    <Negotiation:actor> 
     <rdf:Description> 
      <Negotiation:name>BUYER@anemos:1099/JADE</Negotiation:name> 
     </rdf:Description> 
    </Negotiation:actor> 
    <Negotiation:action> 
     <rdf:Description> 
      <fipa-rdf:type>SUGGEST</fipa-rdf:type> 
      <Negotiation:SUGGEST_prc> 
       <rdf:Description><Negotiation:PRICE_value/></rdf:Description> 
      </Negotiation:SUGGEST_prc> 
      <Negotiation:SUGGEST_qty> 
       <rdf:Description> 
        <Negotiation:QUANTITY_value>1</Negotiation:QUANTITY_value> 
       </rdf:Description> 
      </Negotiation:SUGGEST_qty> 
      <Negotiation:SUGGEST_item> 
       <rdf:Description> 
        <Negotiation:ITEM_colour>black</Negotiation:ITEM_colour> 
        <Negotiation:ITEM_name>Nokia 1100</Negotiation:ITEM_name> 
       </rdf:Description> 
      </Negotiation:SUGGEST_item> 
     </rdf:Description> 
    </Negotiation:action> 
   </rdf:Description> 
  </fipa-rdf:CONTENT_ELEMENT> 
 </fipa-rdf:object> 
</rdf:RDF> 
Fig. 6. Sample message using the RDF Schema message content ontology. 
      
Fig. 7. Step 0 of the Negotiation: Seller proposes 1000 and Buyer rejects it. 
As the buyer has rejected the seller’s offer, at the next step of the negotiation, the 
seller decreases its offered amount by 40 (bid decrement) and waits for the response 
of the buyer (Fig. 8). As the buyer regards (according to its strategy) that the amount 
of 960 is too high, it continues to reject the offer, without issuing a counteroffer. 
Although the protocol allows both for a counteroffer or a rejection of a proposal, the 
decision lies with the agent and is expressed through the strategy. 
 
         
ler proposes 960 and Buyer rejects it. 
 
Fig. 9. Step 2 of the Negotiation: Seller proposes 920 and Buyer rejects it. 
The seller decreases his offer by another 40, offering 920 (Fig. 9). The buyer still 
rejects seller’s offer and the latter subsequently offers 880 (Fig. 10). As the relation 
c+mp>u ⇒ 880+100>1000 is now false, R5 fires and the buyer offers its initial offer, 
which is the amount u/ttb = 1000/5.  
At the next step, the seller offers 840 and waits the buyer for its response (Fig. 11). 
Rule R6 now fires and buyer offers the amount 600. The seller in turn issues an 
“Accept Proposal” (Fig. 12) message and the negotiation terminates. At this point we 
must notice that if seller’s last message were not “Accept Proposal”, the buyer’s 
control module would issue a “Cancel” as the ttb would exceed 5. 
Fig. 8. Step 1 of the Negotiation: Sel
            
          
proposes 880 and Buyer counter-proposes 200. 
         
 
Fig. 12. Last step (5) of the Negotiation: The Seller accepts the buyer's proposal and the Buyer 
confirms. 
Fig. 10. Step 3 of the Negotiation: Seller 
Fig. 11. Step 4 of the Negotiation: Seller proposes 840 and Buyer counter-proposes 600. 
7. Related Work 
Kasbah [10] is an automated negotiation system. Users can create buyer or seller 
agents and engage in a negotiation. Each agent is provided with some information 
through a graphical user interface. Such information includes the date and time within 
which the agent must buy or sell the item, the desired or reservation price, the lowest 
(for sellers) or highest (for buyers) price intended to be offered and the strategy that 
the agent will follow. There are three predefined strategies, which alter the price in 
linear, quadratic or exponential manner, respectively. Negotiation in Kasbah is 
bilateral and competitive. Kasbah also provides a reputation mechanism, which allows 
the buyers or sellers to rate opponent’s behavior during the negotiation. 
AuctionBot [45] is an auction management system supporting the creation, location 
and enactment of different kinds of auctions.  Users can manually interact with the 
system through an HTML-based interface, or alternatively, they can develop their 
own arbitrarily complex bidding agents, and connect them to the auction manager 
through a TCP/IP-level API. This API is generic enough to deal with several kinds of 
auctions (e.g. English, Dutch, double, etc.) through a common set of primitives. The 
task of defining the negotiation strategy is left to the user. Users must develop their 
own agents form scratch, each time they want to enter a negotiation.  
[42] presents a web-based negotiation system for e-commerce, which uses heuristic 
techniques. It introduces an object-oriented content specification language, which is 
based on active object model (AOM). The language and its accompanying GUI tools 
are us their 
preferences. These are stored in a persistent storage. The same language is also used 
by clients to define proposals and counter-proposals, which are wrapped in XML. A 
constraint satisfaction processing component is used for the evaluation of proposals 
and counter-proposals. Authors adopt a declarative approach and each negotiation 
strategy is expressed by means of event-trigger rules (ETRs’). The negotiation 
protocol is an FSM of allowed sequences of actions. 
Our work on DR-NEGOTIATE differs from the works above in that it uses a 
declarative, logical language for expressing the parties’ negotiation strategies, 
offering thus greater expressiveness and flexibility and at the same time allowing the 
strategy specifications to be executed in real time, keeping low the computational 
complexity. 
[2] presents an approach which is based on heuristic techniques for negotiation. They 
propose the construction of a software agent, which represents its owner and is able to 
search online auctions, negotiate with sellers and make purchases in an autonomous 
fashion. The agent not only decides in which auction to participate but also what bid 
to offer. Factors which the agents consider to calculate the current maximum bid at 
any given time are the remaining time, the number of remaining auctions, the level of 
desperateness, and the level of bargaining desire. These individual constraints are then 
combined to compose the agent’s overall position, i.e. its strategy, using weights. In 
ed both by sellers to advertise their products and by buyers to express 
addition, Dumas et al. [12] develops a probabilistic approach to an agent architecture 
for assembling software agents that participate in alternative heterogeneous auctions. 
ContractBot [33] is an automatic contract negotiation system, which integrates the 
three phases of e-contracting, which are discovery, negotiation and execution. 
Courteous Logic Programs [18] are used to represent contracts and rules in general. A 
basic concept is that of a contract template. It is a declarative description of all 
possible outcomes with additional rules, which influence the structure of negotiation. 
Contract templates have two parts. The proto-contract and the negotiation level rules. 
The proto-contract refers to conditions of the deal such as the delivery options, 
payment options, guaranties, etc. It is the part of the contract that remains unchanged. 
The negotiation level rules, answer questions like what is to be negotiated and how. In 
other words, they influence the structure of the negotiation. Transactions in the 
auctions generate additional rules regarding buyers, sellers, prices, quantities etc., 
which along with the proto-contract form the final contract. The system integrates 
with the Michigan AuctionBot, which is an auction server. Furthermore, Grosof et al. 
[19] extended ContractBot to incorporate process knowledge descriptions, i.e. 
ontologies represented in DAML+OIL. They give a conceptual approach to 
specifying LP/RuleML rules on top of DL/DAML+OIL language. 
e-mediator [37] is an auction management server. It is a system which uses game 
theoretic and constrains satisfaction techniques for negotiation. It supports 
combinatorial auctions, in which a bidder may place bids on combination of items and 
may issue simultaneous bids for many combinations. It consists of three basic 
components: (a) eAuctionHouse, the configurable auction server, (b) eCommitter, the 
levele ange 
planner. 
The focus of the works [2], [33] and [37] is different from our work because they 
focus on bidding in multiple auctions. In contrast, our work focuses on 2-party 
negotiations where the negotiation purpose may be other than price. 
Tsang and Gosling [43] define the simple constrained bargaining game where one 
buyer interacts with one seller. They adopt a heuristic approach, and try to find an 
optimal strategy, by comparing its profit against those by other strategies. The general 
rules are the following: The seller is constrained by a cost and the number of time 
units within which it must sell the product (time to sell - tts). The buyer is constrained 
by its utility and the number of time units it has to buy the product (time to buy - ttb). 
None of the participants have information about the other's cost, utility and time 
thresholds. The players make alternative bids with the seller to bid first. Each player 
bids exactly once per time unit. When both players bid for the same price, a sale is 
agr on 
terminates. No one has information
performance. Our work adopts a different approach in that the negotiation history may 
be taken into account, and different negotiation parameters may be set. 
d commitment contract optimizer, and (c) eExchangeHouse, the safe exch
eed. If a sale cannot be agreed before a player runs out of time, the negotiati
 about the other player’s past behavior or 
Rosencheim and Zlotkin [34] present rules of encounter for state-oriented domains. 
Their approach is based on game theoretic techniques for negotiation. In such 
is measure of 
en agents. This 
 a framework that extends and 
 reason about services. TAGA extends FIPA protocols to support 
domains, the goal of the agent is to move the world from an initial state to one or 
more desired states. There is interaction with other agents and limited resources. 
There is the possibility of cooperation, coordination, compromise and conflict. Any 
goal is described from the set of states that satisfy it. There are primitive operations 
that an agents alone can do. When these operations are combined into a coherent 
sequence of actions specifying what both agents are to do, we speak about a joint 
plan. A joint plan transforms the world in a state that may or may not satisfy both 
agents. When agents carry out a joint plan, each agent plays some role. Their theory 
assumes that there is some way of assessing the cost of each role. Th
cost is essential to how an agent evaluates a joint plan. They use terms such as 
individual rational and Pareto optimal and tools from game theory to model agents’ 
decision making model. Compared to this work, DR-NEGOTIATE offers more 
flexibility in defining negotiation strategies. In addition, it adopts a logic-based 
approach, which carries argumentation semantics [16], while [34] is based on game-
theoretic methods. 
Sierra et al [38] propose a formal approach for argumentation-based negotiation. They 
assume that a general and shared social relation is defined betwe
relation can be modeled as a binary function, over a set of social roles. Authors 
assume that participants exchange locutions in a common communication language 
CL defined over a set of illocutionary particles, whose propositional content is 
expressed in a shared logical language L. CL accounts for the set of illocutionary 
particles, necessary to model the set of illocutionary acts. The acts can be divided in 
two sets: Inego corresponds to negotiation particles such as offer, request, accept etc. 
and Ipers, corresponds to persuasive particles such as appeal, threaten, reward. This 
work supports more communication acts than DR-NEGOTIATE, but does not offer a 
general logical language for expressing negotiation strategies. 
Travel Agent Game in Agentcities (TAGA) [46] is
enhances the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) scenario to work in Agentcities, an 
open multi-agent environment, based on FIPA compliant platforms. TAGA uses the 
semantic web languages and tools (RDF, OWL) to: (a) specify the underlying 
common ontologies, (b) as a content language within the FIPA ACL messages, (c) as 
the base for agent knowledge bases via XSB-based reasoning tools, and (d) to 
describe and
different types of auctions. The travel market which TAGA simulates includes service 
registries, service brokerage, wholesalers, peer-to-peer transactions, bilateral 
negotiation, etc. This provides a rich test bed for experimenting with agents and web 
services as well as an interesting scenario to test and challenge agent technology. 
TAGA operates as a continuous open game and anyone can participate and use his/her 
own agent strategy to compete with the others. This work adopts a logical approach 
similar to DR-NEGOTIATE, and addresses more aspects than our work (e.g. 
brokering). On the other hand, it is tailored to a specific domain, while our system is 
domain-independent. 
8. Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper reports on a system for automated agent negotiation, based on a formal and 
executable approach to capture the behavior of parties involved in a negotiation. It 
uses the JADE agent framework, and its major distinctive feature is the use of 
declarative negotiation strategies. The negotiation strategies are expressed in a 
declarative rules language, defeasible logic, and are applied using the implemented 
system DR-DEVICE. The key ideas and the overall system architecture are described, 
and a particular negotiation case is presented in detail. 
Defeasible logic seems to be a very promising solution when it comes to negotiation 
strategies and brokering preferences modeling. It combines all the desired 
characteristics of a language for data modeling. More specific, it is formal with well 
defined semantics, conceptual with a high potential of abstraction, comprehensive, 
modular and executable. It is also highly expressive as it can model a great number of 
diverse cases as we have seen in section 2.  
We plan to extend our work in various ways. 
DR-DEVICE [6] uses a specialized Clips-based syntax for the expression of rules, 
something which makes the rules complicated. There is a need for writing rules in a 
more abstract syntax. We intend to use the semantic web rule language of DR-
DEVICE, which is an extension to RuleML [35]. 
We will seek to integrate the agent negotiation and brokering functions in one system. 
In [11] an agent-based architecture for brokering and negotiation is presented. As a 
m. Someone will 
utomated Agent 
Negotiation with Defeasible Logic-Based Strategies” and the REWERSE Network of Excellence.  
foundation we will use the semantic brokering system of [39] which is also based on 
defeasible logic. 
We will implement a graphical user interface for the integrated syste
be able to load, using a file manager, the files which correspond to the rules of 
negotiation strategy and brokering preferences respectively. The user will also be able 
to adjust negotiation protocol parameters and monitor the progress of the brokering 
and negotiation procedure. To this end, we will use the graphical rule authoring tool 
of DR-DEVICE, which is currently under development. 
Finally, we will try to explore the argumentative nature of defeasible logic [16] by 
building Semantic Web agents that negotiate by exchanging logical arguments [26] 
within the proof layer of the Semantic Web architecture [9]. 
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